

Did Gay Marriage Elect George W. Bush?

Todd Donovan
Western Washington University

Caroline Tolbert
Kent State University

Daniel A. Smith
University of Florida

Janine Parry
University of Arkansas

Abstract

We draw from agenda setting and voter mobilization theories to develop hypotheses about how the gay marriage issue may have affected vote choice in the 2004 presidential election. National opinion data is used to test if gay marriage had greater salience for voters in states where amendments banning gay marriage were on the ballot, and test if the issue had a larger impact on presidential candidate choice in these states than states without such ballot measures. State level opinion data are used to test how support for the gay marriage ban interacted with the mobilization effects of ballot measure campaigns to increase support for President Bush in key swing states. We find that the 2004 gay marriage ballot measures affected the issue agenda in 2004 and had both direct and conditional priming effects on Bush support. Gay marriage was more likely to be cited as an issue used to evaluate candidates by residents of states with marriage ban propositions, and nationwide residents of marriage ban states were significantly more likely to vote for Bush. We also find that the ballot measures may have mobilized turnout of voters supporting the gay marriage ban in Ohio and Arkansas, and that these voters were significantly more likely to vote for Bush.

Paper prepared for the 2005 State Politics Conference, East Lansing, MI, May 14 – 15. We extend our thanks to Scott Keeter at the Pew Research Center for the People and the Press for placing our questions on their national survey. We also wish to thank Eric Rademacher, University of Cincinnati, for placing our questions on a series of Ohio Polls.

Did Gay Marriage Elect George W. Bush?

Statewide ballot measures have the capacity to affect electoral politics in important, albeit indirect ways. We test how a series of anti-gay marriage (or “same-sex” marriage) ballot measures may have affected the composition of state electorates and voter choice in the 2004 presidential contest. Existing scholarly research has largely dismissed any effects of gay marriage, but these studies either lack state-level opinion data (Hillygus and Shields 2005) or reach conclusions without any opinion data (Abramowitz 2004; Burden 2004). Analysis of this subject demands national *and* state-level data to test how state policy proposals may have affected the presidential election.

It is clear that public votes on highly salient policy questions such as California’s tax limitation Proposition 13 have consequences for policy diffusion to other states as well as consequences for the political agenda. The mechanisms of direct democracy (initiatives and referenda) not only have direct effects on public policy (Matsusaka 2005; Gerber 1999), but also indirect effects on the electoral environment. Ballot measures are associated with increases in voters’ political knowledge (M. Smith 2002) and political efficacy (Bowler and Donovan 2002), greater interest group diversity (Boehmke 2002), and they affect the strategies of political parties (D. Smith and Tolbert 2001) and may increase voter participation (M. Smith 2001). On average, an initiative may boost a state’s turnout by almost 1% in presidential elections (Tolbert and D. Smith 2005). Although the aggregate effects of initiative use on turnout are well established, research on the agenda setting effects of ballot measures is only beginning to emerge. At present,

we know relatively little about how ballot measures may simultaneously shape the public agenda and mobilize voters in candidate races.

Building on Nicholson's (2005) innovative work, we develop a theory of how ballot measures can influence candidate elections, and develop specific *agenda setting* and *issue priming hypotheses* about the effects of the same-sex marriage measures.

Although Nicholson finds that ballot measures have the potential to prime voters' evaluations of candidates, he does not consider the mobilizing effect of ballot measures. We contend that statewide ballot measures may have unique priming *and* mobilization effects that alter citizen's evaluations of candidates. We test this theory in the context of the 2004 presidential elections by examining the impact of the anti-gay marriage measures on presidential vote choice. Beyond the direct, substantive impact that ballot measures have on public policy, this expanding form of governance by plebiscite may have important (and previously underappreciated) indirect effects on candidate elections, including presidential vote choice.

Using opinion data from a unique national poll conducted just prior to the 2004 contest, we test if the ballot measures increased the salience of gay marriage as a policy issue and if the issue had a priming effect on evaluations of the presidential candidates. We then draw on turnout literature to develop an *issue mobilization hypothesis* and use opinion data from state-level surveys from Arkansas, Ohio and Michigan to test whether individuals who were mobilized to turnout because of ballot measures were more likely to support George W. Bush. Finally, we move beyond existing research by developing an *intensity hypothesis*, and test whether the *issue priming* and *issue mobilization* effects of state ballot measures interacted to affect vote choices in the presidential election.

Ballot Measures and the Public Agenda

Studies demonstrate that candidates and party officials view ballot initiative campaigns as an indirect means to increase turnout for ‘their’ candidates (Schrag 1998; Fulk 2004; Garrett 2004; Kirkpatrick 2004). Candidates and parties (at the state and national levels) have also used state ballot measures as “wedge” issues (e.g. California’s Anti-illegal immigrant Proposition 187), and as vehicles to force political opponents to divert campaign resources away from other opportunities (see Smith 2001).

Observers have noted many instances of the self-promotional uses of ballot propositions by candidates (Nicholson 2005; Hasen 2000; Schrag 1998; Chavez 1998), and political science has recently directed attention at how political parties use ballot measures strategically to mobilize their supporters. Although these campaigns are largely localized and are often limited to specific issues in individual states, there is evidence they may have broad effects on electoral politics. Nicholson (2005) provides the most systematic demonstration that by shaping the issues voters use when evaluating candidates, ballot measures have broad, national effects on electoral politics. It is not unheard of, for example, for a single ballot issue with a nominally coordinated national campaign to appear simultaneously on many statewide ballots. Ten states and several major cities had Nuclear Freeze measures on their ballots in November 1982 (Nicholson 2005), and in November 1992 voters in 10 states were presented with term limits initiatives (Carey, Niemi, and Powell 2000).

As Nicholson (2005) demonstrates with the Nuclear Freeze, ballot measures can have a powerful effect on priming the agenda in national elections even if candidates

themselves avoid overt discussions of issues placed on a state's ballots. Although there is debate about the relative effect policy issues have on presidential vote choices (Nadeau and Lewis-Beck 2001; Campbell 2000; Holbrook 1996), a large body of work establishes that candidate choice is influenced by issues, particularly if information about the issues is available to voters (Repass 1971; Nie and Anderson 1974; Nie, Verba, and Petrocik 1976; Bartels 1988; Popkin 1991; Gelman and King 1993).

How then, does an issue rise to the point where it is one of the agenda of items that might affect candidate choice? There are several potential vehicles, including overt statements made by candidates themselves. West (1997) and others point to the effects of political advertising. Iyengar and Kinder (1987) also note how media attention to issues structures which issues voters consider when evaluating candidates, and found that exposure to information about an issue can prime voters to consider that issue when evaluating candidates. Voters may make links between issues and candidates even when no link is made in the information presented to them, and voters need not be conscious of any link in order to make such connections (Higgins 1996; Valentino 1999; Mendelberg 2001). Nicholson (2005) uses this literature to develop a theory where ballot measures have the capacity to prime voters' attention to an issue, to the point that an issue on the ballot may influence voters when they evaluate candidates.

Gay Marriage and the 2004 Presidential Election

We suggest that gay marriage ballot measures played a priming role in the 2004 presidential race. Gay rights measures have been recurring, often polarizing issues on state ballots since the late 1970s (Haider Markel 1997; Gamble 1997; Witt and McCorkle

1997). In 2004, social conservative activists and state legislators placed anti-gay marriage questions on the ballot in several states – five of which were considered “battleground” states early in the presidential campaign. Every measure passed, receiving 70% support on average.¹

Our focus here is on how these state-level policy questions may have affected national electoral politics. Although the presidential candidates dedicated little time to overt discussion of the topic, gay marriage emerged as a galvanizing issue early in the 2004 election cycle. Citing a Massachusetts court ruling and actions of the City and County of San Francisco, George W. Bush promoted the need for a constitutional amendment banning gay marriage in February 2004. Over the summer, the US Senate rejected the proposed amendment, but the issue was kept alive in over a dozen states where efforts were underway to place anti-gay marriage amendments to state constitutions on state ballots. Measures banning gay marriage were eventually placed on ballots in 13 states – with voters in 11 states presented with the question in November, in conjunction with the General Election.²

A national coalition of religious conservative groups, which included Focus on the Family, Concerned Women for America, and the Family Research Council, formed in early 2004 “to defend traditional marriage in the wake of a court decision requiring marriage or marriage-type rights for homosexual couples.”³ In seven mostly Republican

¹ Technically, the measures would define marriage as being between a man and woman only. Some of these states had already adopted statutory Defense of Marriage laws. These measures would place the definition of marriage in the states’ constitutions.

² Louisiana (78% yes) and Missouri (71% yes) placed their measures as referendums on late-season primary ballots. The other referendum states included Georgia (76% yes), Kentucky (75% yes), Mississippi (86% yes), Oklahoma (76% yes), and Utah (66%). Only one of these states (Oklahoma) has provisions for constitutional initiatives. Votes in the initiative states were: Arkansas (75% yes), Michigan (56% yes), Montana (67 % yes), North Dakota (73% yes), Ohio (62% yes), and Oregon (57% yes).

³ <http://www.michiganfamily.org/main-resources/Forum%20Online%20Archive/2004/fo-01-07-04.htm>

states, measures were referred to the General Election ballot by the legislature. In six other states (Arkansas, Montana, Michigan, North Dakota, Ohio, and Oregon), citizen-group's petition efforts placed the questions on General Election ballots as initiatives. We suggest that the media attention associated with state-level petition drives, lawsuits, and campaigns associated with these issues placed a greater focus on gay marriage in these states than elsewhere, and thus altered the context of the presidential election in some of these states.

These campaigns were active, yet largely low-budget affairs; collecting signatures in and out of churches and making use of grass-roots volunteers and churches to distribute information. In Ohio, Phil Burrell led the effort to place the amendment on the ballot. Burrell claimed he formed his Ohio Campaign to Protect Marriage (OCPM) PAC in response to the Massachusetts Court's ruling. His organization began collecting signatures in May 2004, submitting 575,000 signatures by August. In Michigan, Citizens for the Protection of Marriage submitted 500,000 signatures to place a constitutional amendment on that state's November ballot. Michigan's Catholic Bishops donated over \$500,000 to Citizens for the Protection of Marriage, with the archdiocese of Detroit contributing \$275,000 (Montemurri and Bello 2004). In Oregon, the Defense of Marriage Coalition and the Oregon Family Council began collecting signatures in late May. The Coalition, founded by the chair of the Multnomah County Republican Party, spent about \$500,000 and collected 244,000 signatures to qualify the Oregon amendment by July (Kaushik 2004).

Although many prominent Republicans in several states (including the battleground state of Ohio) opposed the ban, partisan divisions behind the issue were

made clear by gay marriage ban campaigns and associated media attention. Well-placed Bush surrogates in gay-marriage ban states also worked to link Kerry to supporting gay marriage. The OCPM placed over 3.3 million phone calls (in a state where 5.6 million citizens cast votes) featuring Ohio's Republican Secretary of State (who co-chaired Bush's state election campaign) to promote Amendment 1 (Siege 2004). In Arkansas, where roughly 1 million votes were cast, GOP Gov. Mike Huckabee (Bush's campaign chair in the state) used same-sex marriage to define a "clear difference" between Bush and Kerry. The Republican National Committee sent direct mail to Arkansas voters linking gay marriage to "The Liberal Agenda" (Barth and Parry 2005), and the Yes on Amendment 3 campaign distributed 500,000 cards to potential voters, primarily through churches.⁴ The *Detroit Free Press* reported that African American voters in Michigan just prior to the election received thousands of "robo calls" urging them to vote for Kerry in order to promote the Democrat's goal of defending gay marriage.⁵ In addition, both before and after petition qualification, lawsuits aimed at keeping the measures off various state ballots also added to the media's coverage of the gay marriage issue.

Finally, in all of the states with ballot measures banning gay marriage, the campaigns united thousands of church leaders in their efforts to qualify and promote the amendments. Michigan's Catholic dioceses mailed flyers to the state's Catholics promoting their definition of marriage (Montemurri and Bello 2004), and the OCPM sent 2.5 million bulletin inserts to more than 17,000 Ohio churches. Ohio's Catholic leaders endorsed the ban (Briggs 2004) and Georgia's Catholic bishops directed the state's

⁴ Author interview with John Thomas, press secretary for the pro-amendment "Arkansas Marriage Amendment Committee," 28 February 2005.

⁵ "When you vote this Tuesday, remember to legalize gay marriage by supporting John Kerry," the call said. "It's what we all want. It's a basic Democratic principle" Gray (2004).

Catholics to vote for the ban. The Mormon Church in Utah issued as statement against gay marriage in conjunction with the campaign (Associated Press 2004). In Oregon, the amendment also generated substantial (\$2 million) opposition campaign spending (Kaushik 2004).

Gay Marriage as an Agenda Issue

Given these campaigns and associated media attention, gay marriage had the potential to be an issue that voters used when evaluating the presidential candidates. Public opinion data collected by the Pew Foundation in mid October 2004 demonstrate that voters across the nation were attentive to ballot measures: 42% of respondents in a national sample reported being aware of policy questions (initiatives or referendums) on their state's November ballot.⁶ When asked an open-ended question about which issues were on their ballot, gambling and gay marriage were most frequently cited in the national sample, respectively.⁷ In the 13 states where gay marriage measures qualified (for either a primary or General Election ballot), 45% of respondents who answered the open-ended question mentioned that it was on their state's ballot. The Pew survey also measured voter concerns about a fixed-list of 16 policy issues, including gay marriage. Terrorism, the economy, jobs, education, health care and Iraq ranked highest, but 32% of voters cited gay marriage as being "very important" to them in making their decision

⁶ The national random sample telephone survey was conducted for Pew by the Princeton Research Associates between October 15-19 and included 1307 registered voters representing all fifty states. Report from the Pew Research Center for the People and the Press (2004, October 20) "Race Tightens Again, Kerry's Image Improves." Available [Online]: <http://www.people-press.org>.

⁷ Respondents were asked, "From what you have heard or read, will voters in your state this November be voting on any ballot initiatives, referendums, or state constitutional amendments, or not?"

about which presidential candidate to vote for.⁸ A cross tabulation of this response by voters' state of residence (in a state with a gay marriage ban or not) found that 36.4% of respondents in states where the issue was on the ballot cited gay marriage as being very important to their vote for president, compared to 30.3% in other states. Although the difference is modest (6%), the effect is statistically significant (Chi-square = 4.0, $p < .04$). Post election data also show a higher rate of turnout increase in gay marriage ban states than elsewhere.⁹ In the next section, we propose hypotheses about how the gay marriage measures affected voting in the 2004 presidential election.

Hypotheses

Agenda Setting and Issue Priming

H1a: Nationally, the importance of gay marriage for presidential vote choice was higher in states with gay marriage bans on their ballots than those without such measures.

H1b: State-level campaigns associated with the ballot measures banning gay marriage primed voters to consider gay marriage when making their choice for president.

The agenda setting and issue priming hypotheses are tested in two parts, using national and state level survey data to estimate models of vote choice. First, to gauge the issue's agenda setting potential, we use national data to test whether individuals residing in states with gay marriage propositions on the ballot were more likely to believe that the issue of gay marriage was very important in their choice of presidential candidates.

Second, to gauge issue priming potential, we test whether individuals who supported the

⁸ The survey asked, "In making your decision about who to vote for in the presidential election, how important will _____ be?" with the 16 issues rotated randomly.

⁹ VAP turnout was up 6.3% in states with marriage ban amendments, while up 5.3% elsewhere, based on calculations from data posted on Michael McDonald's United States Election Project web site. http://elections.gmu.edu/voter_turnout.htm.

ban were more likely to vote for Bush, all else equal, using national and state survey data. Together, our hypotheses examine whether the gay marriage ballot measures shaped the issue agenda and primed citizen evaluations of the 2004 presidential candidates.

Issue Mobilization

H2: Gay marriage ban propositions shaped the composition of the electorate in states with this issue on the ballot.

We expect that campaigns associated with gay marriage propositions mobilized some individuals to turnout, but not others. We test this hypothesis using state survey data designed to measure the degree to which citizens were motivated by ballot measures to turnout.

Intensity Hypothesis

H3: State-level gay marriage ban measures increased turnout among supporters of the ban, who voted for Bush.

We expect that individuals who supported the gay marriage ban and who were more motivated to turnout because of the ballot issue were more likely to cast a vote for Bush. This is based on the assumption that marriage ban campaigns, with their implicit linkages to Bush, benefited Bush by priming people to associate Bush with the marriage ban while mobilizing people with an intense opposition to gay marriage. We test this hypothesis by estimating vote choice with an interaction term that measures support for the ban multiplied by how much the respondent was motivated by ballot issues to turnout. This interaction tests if the agenda setting effects and mobilization effects of ballot

measures worked together to affect support for Bush. This final hypothesis is tested with state survey data. We assume, further, that issue priming and issue mobilization effects of gay marriage on candidate vote were not neutral since there were more gay marriage ban supporters than opponents in every state. Any interaction between priming the issue and mobilizing voters over the issue would thus benefit Bush. Even if opposition to the gay marriage measures had a positive effect on propensity to turnout and vote for Kerry of equal magnitude to the effect that support had on the propensity to turnout and vote Bush, Bush would still be advantaged.¹⁰

Data, Methods and Results

To assess these hypotheses, we analyze data from a mid October 2004 Pew Research Center for the People and the Press national survey as well as six 2004 pre-election statewide surveys commissioned by the authors: three Ohio Poll surveys (conducted in September, October and November), two Michigan surveys (conducted in October and November) and one Arkansas survey conducted in October.

Testing for agenda setting and issue-priming (Nationally)

The Pew national survey asked, “In making your decision about who to vote for in the presidential election, how important will the issue of gay marriage be?” Respondents indicating “very important” were coded 1, with those indicating “somewhat important,” “not too important,” or “not at all important” coded 0. In Table A1, we

¹⁰ In fact, there was no such effect for Kerry. We have also tested this intensity hypothesis by estimating the effect of being an opponent of the marriage ban and being mobilized by ballot measures on support for Kerry. Results are quite different than those reported in Table A3 – A4 in that these voters were not as likely to support Kerry as ban supporters were to vote Bush.

report a logistic regression model estimating if someone reported that gay marriage was a “very important” issue for them when considering the presidential candidates, and we report estimates of presidential vote choice as being a function of concerns about gay marriage. The primary independent variable of interest predicting concern about gay marriage is a dummy representing residence in one of the 13 states where the gay marriage ban was placed on the ballot. Previous research on public opinion about gay rights ballot questions demonstrates a need to control for partisanship and religion. Given findings that Republicans and Protestants are less supportive of ballot measures extending rights to gays and lesbians (Donovan and Bowler 1997), we expect those voters may be more likely to be attentive to the marriage issue. We account for religion with a dummy variable representing self-identified Protestants, and partisanship with two dummies representing Republicans and Democrats, respectively, with independents as the reference group. Past studies also establish that education is associated with support for civil liberties for gays and lesbians (Sniderman et al. 1991). The models control for education (an ordinal scale), as well as age (in years), gender (1=female, 0=male), race (1=white, 0=other) and income (an ordinal scale).¹¹ Vote choice models also control for the importance of other issues in evaluating the presidential candidates, including terrorism, the economy and Iraq.¹²

¹¹ For income, the question wording was “Last year, that is in 2003, what was your total family income from all sources, before taxes?” Responses ranged from 1=“less than \$10,000” to 9= “\$150,000 or more.” For education: “What is the last grade or class that you completed in school?” Responses ranged from 1 = “none, or grade 1-8” to 7= “Post-graduate training or professional schooling after college.” For religion, “What is your religious preference -- Protestant, Roman Catholic, Jewish, Muslim, Mormon, or an orthodox church such as the Greek or Russian Orthodox Church?” “Protestant” were coded 1 and all others 0.

¹² Question wording was: “In making your decision about who to vote for in the presidential election, how important will the issue of the economy be?” “In making your decision about who to vote for in the presidential election, how important will the issue of Iraq be?” “In making your decision about who to vote for in the presidential election, how important will the issue of terrorism be?” For each question,

National Data Results

Table A1 illustrates that after accounting for these factors, respondents living in states where the gay marriage ban was on the ballot were significantly more likely to mention that the issue was very important in their consideration of the presidential candidates ($p < .028$, one-tail). Partisanship, religion, education, race, and gender also have unique, independent effects on the likelihood that a respondent said the issue was very important in their presidential vote. Republicans, Protestants, non-whites, those with less education, and women were significantly more likely, respectively, to say that gay marriage was a very important issue for them when considering the presidential candidates.

The model predicts a .27 probability of a white, independent Protestant woman citing gay marriage as a “very important” when evaluating the president candidates for residents of states where the question was not on the ballot. The predicted probability of a voter with the same demographic profile saying this bumps up to .33 in states where the gay marriage question was on the ballot. The estimates also illustrate the potential additive effects of partisanship, education and religion. For example, a white, Protestant, Republican woman with low education, living in a state with a gay marriage ban is predicted to have a .42 probability of saying gay marriage was very important in her consideration of the presidential candidates. A woman with the same demographic profile from a non-ban state is predicted to have a .36 probability of saying this.

Alternative versions of these models (not reported here) estimating Kerry vote found that

respondents indicating “very important” were coded 1, with those indicating “somewhat important,” “not too important,” or “not at all important” coded 0.

respondents who were concerned about gay marriage were significantly less likely to support Kerry, and that concerns about gay marriage interacted with residence in a state with a gay marriage measure to decrease the probability a respondent would support Kerry.

These data suggest that same-sex marriage ballot measures had the potential to subtly alter the agenda for voters residing in states where the issue was on the ballot. Our point is not that voters paid close attention to positions that Bush or Kerry took on this issue, or that the candidate's campaigns brought direct attention to the gay marriage issue. Rather, the presence of a highly visible, controversial policy question on a state's ballot may have altered the motives that people had when considering Bush and Kerry while also altering the weights that some voters assign to issues when judging the candidates. These results are consistent with Nicholson's (2005:20) theory of the agenda setting capacity of ballot measures, and suggest that gay marriage measures conditioned the policy agenda in 2004 and primed some voters to consider this issue when judging the candidates.

But did it affect who they voted for? Table A1 (Column 2) reports a simple estimation of presidential vote intention using the October 2004 Pew data. The dependent variable is coded 1 if the respondent reported an intention to vote Bush, 0 if Kerry or other. We find a significant, independent effect of concern about the gay marriage issue on support for Bush ($p < .028$, one-tail). This effect holds when controlling for partisanship, age, gender, race, religion, income, and education. The significant of gay marriage in the 2004 presidential contest remained even after controlling for issues such as terrorism, the economy and Iraq. Table 1 displays the

predicted probabilities estimated by the models of presidential vote choice reported in Table A1. Setting the control variables at their means or modal category, the first vote model (From table A1, Column 2) predicts that a white Protestant, female independent with mean levels of education, age and income had a .57 probability of supporting Bush if she believed that gay marriage was a very important issue for evaluating the candidates, but a .48 probability if she did not believe that gay marriage was a very important issue, a 9 percentage point difference based on this issue. The simulation also accounts for whether the voter believed Iraq, terrorism and the economy were very important in evaluating the presidential candidates.

[Table 1 about here]

Furthermore, when a similar model (reported in Table A1, Column 3) is specified with the addition of an interaction term (resides in ban state * gay marriage a very important issue), we find that voters living in states with marriage ban measures who also considered gay marriage a very important issue were significantly more likely to plan to vote for Bush ($p < .052$, two tailed). This interaction reflects the unique priming effect that these anti-gay marriage measures had in states where they were on the ballot. That is, respondents in marriage ban states who said gay marriage was very important to their evaluation of presidential candidates were more likely to support Bush, above and beyond any direct association that existed between their gay marriage concerns and partisan propensity to support Bush.

The magnitude of this interaction is substantial as seen in Table 1: a respondent living in a state with a marriage ban on the ballot who also said gay marriage was an important concern when evaluating the candidates is predicted to have a .69 probability

of supporting Bush. In contrast, the probability of supporting Bush is .49 (that is, a Kerry supporter) among demographically identical respondents living in states where gay marriage was not on the ballot who said gay marriage was not very important to them. Residing in a state with gay marriage on the ballot and believing the issue was very important in the presidential election moved this potential Kerry voter to a Bush voter, a 20 percentage point increase in the probability of voting for Bush.

The substantive importance of gay marriage can also be seen in Column 3 of Table A1. The positive effect of the gay marriage issue on support for Bush more than doubles for respondents residing in states where the issue was on the statewide ballot (the logit coefficient changes from .38 in the baseline model to .91 in the conditional effects model). Furthermore, a comparison of the coefficients for the dummy variables representing a voter's concerns about other issues illustrates that gay marriage may have more than offset concerns about Iraq. Voters concerned about Iraq and the economy were less likely to vote for Bush, while those citing terrorism and gay marriage were more likely to vote for Bush. However, the magnitude of the coefficient for the gay marriage issue in states where it appeared on the ballot (.91) is larger than the effect that concerns about Iraq had on diminishing support for Bush (-.71).

Testing for issue priming and mobilization in battleground states

The national data demonstrate that gay marriage was more consequential in affecting voter choices for president in states with marriage ban measures than in states without, but state samples provide more leverage on the question of how specific state campaigns to ban gay marriage affected voting. To clarify our presentation and reduce

sampling error, we pooled three Ohio surveys into one sample, with time dummy variables distinguishing the October and November samples from a baseline (September survey). The pooled Ohio surveys include 2725 cases.¹³ We also pooled October and November Michigan surveys into one sample with a dummy variable for November to measure time, creating a sample of 1210 respondents.¹⁴ Our analysis of Arkansas made use of one survey of 758 respondents conducted in October.¹⁵

We test each of our three hypotheses by estimating if a respondent intended to vote for Bush, with intentions to vote Bush coded as 1 and for Kerry or a third party candidate as 0.¹⁶ We test the *priming hypothesis* that gay marriage shaped citizen evaluations of candidate races with a dummy variable measuring policy preferences (whether or not the respondent supported the state's gay marriage ban measure).¹⁷ A positive coefficient for this variable suggests voters linked their policy preferences for a ban on gay marriage to their presidential vote choice. We test the *issue mobilization*

¹³ The Ohio Polls were conducted by the Institute for Policy Research at the University of Cincinnati using random digit dialed telephone surveys. The results are generalizable to the state. The September Poll was conducted from September 12 through 18, 2004 and included a random sample of 808 likely and unlikely voters. The October survey was conducted from October 11 through October 17, 2004, and included a random sample of 757 likely voters from throughout the state. The final poll of 877 likely voters were interviewed between October 27 and November 1, 2004.

¹⁴ The Michigan Polls were conducted by EPIC/MRA, a private polling firm located in East Lansing, Michigan, using random digit dialed telephone surveys. The results are generalizable to the state. The October survey included a random sample of 610 likely Michigan voters. The November post-election poll included a random sample of 600 respondents who voted in the election.

¹⁵ The Arkansas Poll was conducted by the Political Science Department at the University of Arkansas and was a random digit dialed telephone survey.

¹⁶ In the Ohio Poll, for example, the question was worded "Suppose the election for president was being held today and the candidates were . . . George W. Bush and Dick Cheney, the Republicans . . . and John Kerry and John Edwards, the Democrats. Which would you vote for?" Similar questions were asked in the Michigan and Arkansas surveys.

¹⁷ Respondents in the Ohio Poll were asked "A proposed amendment to the Ohio Constitution may appear on the Ohio ballot this November. The proposed amendment to Ohio Constitution states that: 'Only a union between one man and one woman may be a marriage valid in or recognized by Ohio and its political subdivisions. Ohio and its political subdivisions shall not create or recognize a legal status for relationships of unmarried individuals that intends to approximate the design, qualities, significance or effect of marriage.' Some people will vote for this constitutional amendment, while others will vote against it. What about you? Would you vote for or against this amendment to the Ohio Constitution?" Similar questions were asked in all three states.

hypothesis with a variable representing whether the respondent reported being motivated to turnout by issues on the ballot. Motivation is measured by response to the question, “How much does your support or opposition to ballot measures in this election motivate you to vote?” We created an ordinal variable coded 4 for “very motivating,” 3 for “somewhat motivating,” 2 for “only a little motivating” and 1 for “not at all motivating.” Identical question wording was used in all six surveys.

Testing the intensity hypothesis

We hypothesize that the interaction between the priming effect and the issue mobilization effect of the anti-gay marriage measures could boost support for Bush, over and above the direct effects (or base terms). We test whether respondents who supported the marriage ban and who reported being mobilized by issues on the ballot (there were multiple issues on the ballot in Arkansas and Michigan) were more likely to support Bush with an interaction term (mobilized*support ban). This interaction measures the simultaneous effect of issue priming and issue mobilization on voters’ choice of presidential candidate.

For comparability across the state surveys we selected a group of similar variables to control for attitudinal and demographic characteristics of respondents.¹⁸ In our multivariate estimates we control for the following: (1) educational attainment¹⁹ (2) gender using a dummy variable assuming the value of 1 for male respondents; (3) race

¹⁸ A question on retrospective personal economic evaluations was included only on the October Michigan survey and Arkansas survey. When we re-estimated our models including this additional control variable the results were unchanged from what is reported here.

¹⁹ In the Ohio Polls, education is measured on a four-point scale with 1=less than high school and 4 = college graduate. In the Michigan surveys, education is measured on a six-point scale from 1= less than a high school diploma to 6 = post graduate work. In the Arkansas survey, education is measured on an NES type seven-point scale ranging from 1= no high school, to 7= graduate or professional degree.

using a dummy variable representing whites (non-Hispanic); and (4) age (in years). The Arkansas survey included an 8-point scale which we use as a control for income.²⁰ To control for the likelihood that Republicans are more likely to vote for Bush, we created dummy variables assuming the value of 1 if individuals were Democrats or Republicans, respectively. Independents serve as the reference group.²¹ We also control for Protestant religious affiliation. Questions on the Michigan and Arkansas surveys allow us to directly measure Protestant religious beliefs, with Protestants coded 1, and followers of other religions or non-believers coded 0.²² No questions about the religion of the respondent were included in the Ohio surveys. To overcome this omission we created a measure of the percent of individuals in each of Ohio's 88 counties who are Protestants based on the 2000 census, and merged this aggregate variable with the individual level survey responses.²³

²⁰ Responses to the question "Which of the following income categories best describes your total 2003 household income?" were coded on an eight-point scale from 1, "\$7,500 or less" to 8, "over 100,000." We have no reason to expect that the omission of an income control creates an omitted variable bias. Column 2 in Table A1 demonstrates that the our main substantive results are still obtained when income is included as a control in the national sample. Likewise, the effects of issue priming, issue mobilization, and our intensity interaction are nearly identical when income is excluded from the Arkansas estimates reported in Tables A2 – A4.

²¹ We created this variable from an NES type seven-point measure of partisanship for the Arkansas and Michigan surveys and a three-point measure of partisanship for the Ohio survey. For the Arkansas and Michigan surveys, strong Republican and weak Republicans were coded as Republicans, with leaning Republican coded as an independent. The identical coding was used for Democratic partisans.

²² Question wording in the Arkansas survey was "Which of the following best describes your current religious preference?" with Protestant coded 1, and Catholic, Jewish, something else and none coded 0. In the Michigan surveys Protestants were coded 1, and Catholic, Eastern Orthodox, Muslim, other and none coded 0.

²³ This variable measures the percent of individuals in county who are Protestant. Data from Jones, Dale, et al. (2002) *Religious Congregations & Memberships in the United States, 2000*. Nashville, TN: Glenmary Research Center.

State-level Results

Table A2 reports estimates of presidential voting in these three states. In each state, we see the potential for a strong priming effect of gay marriage on the probability a voter supported Bush. In Ohio, Michigan and Arkansas supporters of the ban were significantly more likely to indicate they would vote for Bush. This policy preference had a clear, independent relationship with evaluations of the presidential candidates, above and beyond partisanship and religion. These battleground state data, combined with our analysis of the national sample, suggest the gay marriage ballot measures may have *primed* how voters evaluated Bush.

These state-level estimates of intentions to vote for Bush are largely consistent with our estimates from the national sample. Coefficients for the control variables in Table A2 are in the expected direction, with Republican identifiers more likely to support President Bush in all three states, with Democrats less likely to. Across states and in the national sample we also find substantial racial effects with whites (non-Hispanic) significantly more supportive of the Bush than racial minorities. In Arkansas we find a gender effect, with males more likely to support Bush than females, as well as the importance of age: younger respondents were considerably more likely to support Bush than older respondents. Religion (Protestant) was not a statistically significant factor in any of the state models estimating presidential vote choice when attitudes about gay marriage are included.²⁴ Suburban residents were more likely to cast a vote for Bush in Ohio and Arkansas than those residing in rural or urban areas.

²⁴ This likely reflects limited intra-state variance in the relationship religion and voting, since Catholics dominate the reference category in each state. Protestants and Catholics made up 83% of voters in Ohio, 81% in Michigan, and 89% in Arkansas (where just 8% were Catholic). In each of these states, exit polls show Catholics and Protestants supported Bush in nearly equal proportions.

Table A3 includes the same set of predictor variables as Table A2 but adds in the variable testing whether ballot questions motivated the respondent to turnout and vote. The variable is used to test the *issue mobilization hypothesis*. We find no direct effect of issue mobilization on intentions to support Bush in Ohio and Michigan, suggesting that the direct effect of being mobilized to vote by issues on the ballot had no effect on candidate vote choice in these states. In Arkansas, however, which had three questions on the ballot (related to term limits, economic development for job creation and the gay marriage ban), respondents who reported being motivated to turnout by ballot issues were significantly more likely to support President Bush. This suggests ballot measures had a direct mobilization effect assisting Bush in Arkansas, above and beyond the priming effect that support for the marriage ban may have had on intentions to vote for Bush.

Table A4 reports tests of our issue intensity hypothesis using the same models from Table A3, with the addition of an interaction term representing respondents who supported the ban who also reported being mobilized to turnout by ballot measures. These models test whether Bush benefited from support of people intensely opposed to gay marriage: voters mobilized by issue being on the ballot who also supported the gay marriage ban. In Ohio, where gay marriage was the only policy question on the state ballot, we find evidence of this. The coefficient for the interaction term (mobilized * support ban) is positive and statistically significant in Ohio, but not Michigan or Arkansas. Individuals who supported the ban in Ohio who reported being highly motivated to turnout were significantly more likely to vote for Bush than those who supported the ban but were not motivated to turnout by gay marriage. This suggests that issue priming and issue mobilization interacted with one another to create a simultaneous

effect on Bush support in Ohio. Theoretically, the analysis suggests that Nicholson's (2005) agenda setting theory of ballot measures is necessary, but not sufficient to explain how ballot measures may shape candidate races. In Ohio, the intensity of the priming effect of the gay marriage ban combined with a mobilization effect to boost support for Bush.

Table 2 provides a summary of substantive magnitude of the priming and mobilization effects estimated with the state level opinion data. Not only are the effects of the gay marriage ballot measures statistically significant, the substantive magnitudes are large. The cell entries in Table 2 are predicted probabilities of voting Bush estimated from the logistic regression coefficients reported in Table A2. For the simulations (benchmark model) we hold age, income and education at their means. We assume the respondent is an independent white female Protestant and resides in an urban area (modal values).²⁵

Table 2 illustrates the potential magnitude of the direct priming effect of gay marriage on the probability a survey respondent intended to vote for Bush. Holding constant partisanship, religion, and other demographic factors, the probability that an Ohio respondent who supported the gay marriage ban intended to vote Bush was .26 greater than a similar individual who opposed the ban. This effect is even larger in Michigan and Arkansas. In Michigan, support of the gay marriage ban corresponded with a .41 increase in the probability of voting Bush. In Arkansas, it corresponded with a .52 increased probability of voting Bush.

[Table 2 and Table 3 about here]

²⁵ For the Ohio simulations, percent Protestant population per county set at the mean.

Table 3 illustrates the potential magnitude of issue mobilization and intensity effects of the gay marriage measures in Arkansas and Ohio. The probability of voting for Bush among supporters of the ban who reported low levels of turnout motivation by the ballot question was .48 in Arkansas, and .46 in Ohio (that is, a predicted vote for *Kerry*). In contrast, among those who supported the ban and reported being very motivated to turnout by the ballot question, the probability of voting for Bush increased to .63 in Arkansas and .61 in Ohio. Thus the mobilizing potential of the ballot measures (beyond issue support) appear to have flipped a potential Kerry voter into the Bush column in these two swing states. Stated another way, the mobilizing effect of the ballot measures increased the probability of voting for Bush by 15 percentage points, beyond the effect of support for the gay marriage ban. These probability simulations provide additional evidence that the agenda setting effects of gay marriage and mobilization effects of the anti-gay marriage measures may have worked together to increase support for President Bush in 2004.

Conclusion

Together, analysis of the national data and multiple state samples provide consistent evidence suggesting that the anti-gay marriage ballot measures had a significant effect in shaping voting in 2004 presidential elections. With respect to agenda setting at the national level, our results demonstrate that gay marriage was more likely to be among the set of issues that voters considered when evaluating Kerry and Bush if they lived in states where it was on the ballot. Residence in a ban state (and the associated campaigns and controversy) encouraged voters to be more attentive to the issue of gay

marriage. More importantly, the national data demonstrate that the issue created a unique effect on support for Bush across the thirteen states where marriage bans were on the ballot. Nationally, the direct priming effects of the ballot measures banning gay marriage lead to a .09 increase in the probability of voting for Bush, holding constant partisanship, religion, other salient issue concerns (Iraq, economy, and terrorism) and demographic factors. We also find conditional priming effects at the national level to be contingent on the intensity of preferences about same sex marriages; individuals residing in a state with gay marriage on the ballot and believing the issue of gay marriage was very important in their vote for president had a .20 increased probability of voting for Bush than a similar respondent residing in a state without gay marriage on the ballot and who was not concerned with the issue.

In three battle-ground states, we find strong evidence that the ballot measures had priming effects on voter's evaluations of the presidential candidates in the 2004 election. Using state-level survey data, we find evidence suggesting that the anti-gay marriage measures had a positive priming effect on voters' evaluations of Bush. We also find priming effects of the same-sex ballot measures to be conditional on the mobilizing effects of the ballot measures. Survey respondents who reported being very motivated to vote because of the issues on the ballot in their state and supported the marriage ban were significantly more likely to vote for Bush in Ohio and Arkansas, two swing states in the election. In two states we find evidence suggesting that ballot measures motivated people to turnout, and that these motivated voters overwhelmingly supported Bush.

In Michigan we only find evidence of a direct priming effect of gay marriage. The lack of a turnout effect in Michigan may be due to differences in the political context

of that state, or differences in the scope of the marriage ban campaigns. In Ohio, we know that the increase in turnout between 2000 and 2004 was second highest in the nation, so it would seem that some distinctive mobilization efforts were effective in that state. This might explain why we find an interaction between issue mobilization and issue priming associated with the gay marriage ban in Ohio alone, as increases in voter turnout rates in Michigan and Arkansas were close to the national mean.

Finally, there is the question that serves as the title of this paper—was gay marriage decisive in electing George Bush? There is no definitive answer to this question. Our national data show effects of the issue were subtle, but were more than twice as large in states where the ban was on the statewide ballot. We suggest that issue priming and issue mobilization associated with the gay marriage helped Bush's general efforts to define Kerry as "too liberal" and may have caused states as Missouri (53% Bush), Arkansas (54% Bush) and Georgia (58% Bush) to be slightly less competitive for Kerry than would have been the case absent the marriage ban campaigns. But Bush won these states by such large margins that it is difficult to conclude gay marriage could have been decisive.

But what about the decisive state of Ohio, where Bush's margin of victory was less than 119,000 votes? Our surveys found that 29% of Ohio respondents supported the marriage ban and reported being very motivated to turnout by it. Turnout in Ohio increased nearly 10% in 2004, second only to the increase in South Dakota spurred by a heated US Senate contest. CNN exit polls show Bush enjoyed above average increases in support over his 2000 Ohio performance among the same voters we found to support the gay marriage ban there (see Table A5): those with low education, the elderly, and non-

whites. Although whites were still far more likely to vote Bush, we find non-whites consistently more likely to support the gay marriage ban. The magnitude of the effect is largest in Ohio, and exit polls show Bush's increase in support among African Americans in Ohio – up 7% - was nearly four times the rate of his increased support nationally among African Americans. Likewise, Bush increased his support among Ohio's over age 60 voters by 10%, his support among Ohio voters with no education beyond a high school degree increased by 12%, and his support among frequent church goers increased by 17%, far above his national average (nationally, he increased his support among these voters by 7%, 10%, and 1%, respectively).

All of this is consistent with our issue mobilization thesis: key groups of voters opposed to gay marriage were mobilized to turnout in Ohio because of the ballot measure and they swung toward Bush. We can get a sense of how the issue may have tilted the outcome in Ohio to Bush by projecting Bush's increased support among these key groups (measured in exit polls) into raw numbers of voters. These (crude) estimates illustrate that the increase in Bush support among African Americans could have delivered a maximum of 39,000 votes to Bush in 2004, while the increase in support among those with no high school education could have produced a maximum of 27,000 votes for Bush. Increased support among frequent church goers and the elderly could have produced a maximum of 133,000, and 112,000 of Bush's votes in Ohio, respectively. Of course, we have no way of knowing, definitively, how many of these voters may have selected Bush because of the effects of the gay marriage campaign.²⁶

Our study moves beyond existing literature by demonstrating that ballot propositions not only mobilize voter turnout and prime evaluations of candidates, but that

²⁶ These crude calculations can be found at <http://www.wvu.edu/~donovan/Ohio04.xls>.

these effects may interact in a manner that affects outcomes in candidate races. We thus provide evidence that direct democracy can have important consequences for candidate races, the electoral process, and representative government more generally. The scope of issues on state ballots capable of having such effects remains to be determined, and issues not appearing on state ballots are likely to be more important in affecting candidate choices. As Hillygus and Shields (2005) have demonstrated, attitudes about gay marriage did affect support for Bush in 2004 independent of other issue concerns, but other issues had much greater independent effects nationally on voting for Bush. However, while other policy issues besides gay marriage clearly were important in driving support for Bush in the 2004 election, we find the effect of gay marriage remains significant even after controlling for other issue concerns. Our findings provide strong support that the gay marriage ballot measures mattered, and that they aided Bush in states where it was on the ballot. Other issues may have kept Bush even with Kerry in Ohio, but gay marriage may very well have put Bush over the top in the state.

Table 1: Agenda / Priming Effects of the Gay Marriage Ban: Predicted Probability of Voting Bush Nationwide, 2004.

Priming Effect: National Table A1		Interaction Effect: National Table A1	
Predicted effect:	Prob. of support Bush		Prob. of support Bush
R said gay marriage issue not very important when considering presidential candidates	.48 (.05)	Resides in state <i>without</i> gay marriage on the ballot and said gay marriage <i>not</i> very important issue	.49 (.06)
R said gay marriage issue is very important when considering presidential candidates	.57 (.06)	Resides in state <i>with</i> gay marriage on the ballot and said gay marriage <i>is</i> very important issue	.69 (.08)
Change (No to Yes)	.09	Change	.20

Note: Predicted probabilities estimated with Clarify. Numbers in parentheses are standard errors for the predicted probabilities. We hold age, income and education at their means. Gender is set at female, race/ethnicity at white (non-Hispanic) and religion at Protestant. All simulations estimated for independents. Believing terrorism, Iraq and economy “very important” in presidential vote set at modal categories (yes).

Table 2: Priming Effects of the Gay Marriage Ban: Predicted Probability of Voting Bush, 2004.

	Priming Effect: Ohio Table A2	Priming Effect: Michigan Table A2	Priming Effect: Arkansas Table A2
Predicted effect:	Prob. Support For Bush	Prob. Support for Bush	Prob. Support for Bush
No on marriage ban	.31 (.05)	.25 (.06)	.09 (.04)
Yes on marriage ban	.57 (.06)	.66 (.07)	.61 (.08)
Change (No to Yes)	.26	.41	.52

Note: Predicted probabilities estimated with Clarify. Numbers in parentheses are standard errors for the predicted probabilities. We hold age, income and education at their means. Gender is set at female and race/ethnicity at white. The respondent is assumed to reside in an urban area. For the Arkansas survey, respondent assumed to be Protestant. For the Ohio simulations, percent Protestant in the county set at mean. All simulations estimated for independents.

Table 3: Mobilization and Intensity Effects: Predicted Probability of Voting Bush, 2004.

	Mobilization Effect: Arkansas Table A3	Intensity Effect: Ohio Table A4
Predicted effect	Prob. of support Bush	Prob. of support Bush
Support ban, <i>low</i> motivation by ballot measures	.48 (.10)	.46 (.07)
Support ban, <i>high</i> motivation by ballot measures	.63 (.08)	.61 (.06)
Change	.15	.15

Note: Predicted probabilities estimated with Clarify. Numbers in parentheses are standard errors for the predicted probabilities. We hold age, income and education at their means. Gender is set at female and race/ethnicity at white. The respondent is assumed to reside in an urban area. For the Arkansas survey, respondent assumed to be Protestant. For the Ohio simulations, percent Protestant in the county set at mean. All simulations estimated for independents.

Table A1: Agenda Setting and Priming Effects of Gay Marriage Issue in the Presidential Election (National Survey Data).

<i>Covariates</i>	Importance of Gay Marriage in Presidential Choice			Intend to Vote Bush		Intend to Vote Bush	
	Coef. (S.E.)	P> z		Coef. (S. E.)	P> z	Coef. (S. E.)	P> z
Resides in Gay Marriage Ban State ^a	.25 (.14)	.037				-.21 (.28)	.459
Gay Marriage Issue Very Important in Pres. Choice ^a				.38 (.22)	.028	.15 (.25)	.547
Ban State * Gay Marriage Issue Very Important						.91 (.47)	.052
Terrorism Issue Very Important in Pres. Choice				2.14 (.31)	.000	2.17 (.31)	.000
Iraq Issue Very Important in Pres. Choice				-.68 (.27)	.012	-.70 (.27)	.010
Economy Very Important in Pres. Choice				-1.34 (.27)	.000	-1.33 (.27)	.000
Republican	.42 (.15)	.006		2.62 (.27)	.000	2.60 (.27)	.000
Democrat	-.24 (.17)	.142		-2.51 (.27)	.000	-2.55 (.27)	.000
Age	.002 (.004)	.628		-.00 (.01)	.840	-.00 (.01)	.791
Male	.31 (.13)	.017		.25 (.21)	.242	.25 (.21)	.233
White	-.46 (.17)	.007		.74 (.30)	.013	.76 (.30)	.012
Education	-.07 (.04)	.097		-.10 (.08)	.184	-.10 (.08)	.190
Income	-.05 (.03)	.147		.12 (.05)	.023	.12 (.05)	.026
Protestant	.46 (.13)	.000		.31 (.21)	.138	.31 (.21)	.147
Constant	-.77 (.40)	.052		-1.33 (.60)	.026	-1.28 (.60)	.035
Pseudo R ²	.04			.524		.526	
LR Chi ²	53.32	.000		265.02	.000	267.03	.000
Number	1232			951		951	

Note: The dependent variable in columns 1 and 2 measured with the following question: In making your decision about who to vote for in the presidential election, how important will the issue of gay marriage be? Respondents indicating “very important” were coded 1, with those indicating “somewhat important,” “not too important,” or “not at all important” coded 0. The dependent variable in column 3 is presidential vote choice in 2004, with certain Bush and lean Bush coded 1, non-registered voters coded missing, and all others (certain Kerry, lean Kerry, certain Nader and lean Nader) coded 0. Unstandardized logistic regression coefficients with robust standard errors in parentheses. Reported probabilities based on two-tailed tests, except where noted. Statistically significant coefficients at .10 or less in bold. ^a Since hypothesis is directional, one-tailed significance test reported for these covariates only.

Table A2: Priming Effects of the Gay Marriage Measures on Support for President Bush

<i>Covariates</i>	Ohio		Michigan		Arkansas	
	Coef. (S. E.)	P> z	Coef. (S.E.)	P> z	Coef. (S. E.)	P> z
Supports Gay Marriage Ban	1.09 (.16)	.000	1.81 (.22)	.000	2.90 (.39)	.000
Republican	2.61 (.22)	.000	2.89 (.29)	.000	2.98 (.45)	.000
Democrat	-1.90 (.22)	.000	-2.12 (.25)	.000	-2.36 (.31)	.000
Age	-.003(.04)	.938	.02 (.05)	.717	-.02 (.01)	.093
Male	-.14 (.16)	.379	-.02 (.21)	.929	.57 (.28)	.041
White	2.74 (.50)	.000	1.11 (.37)	.002	1.07 (.40)	.007
Education	.09 (.08)	.284	-.10 (.07)	.168	.13 (.10)	.206
Income					.03 (.08)	.676
Protestant ^b	.60 (1.26)	.776	.09 (.21)	.659	.06 (.32)	.862
Suburban	.30 (.18)	.098			.58 (.34)	.093
Rural	.18 (.21)	.400	.04 (.28)	.897	.18 (.36)	.620
Oct	-.39 (.20)	.048				
Nov	-.19 (.18)	.290	.41 (.21)	.050		
Constant	-3.70 (.68)	.000	-2.24 (.58)	.000	-3.47 (.76)	.000
Pseudo R ²	.58		.54		.55	
LR Chi ²	798.61		742.31		454.60	
Number	2189		985		593	

Note: Dependent variable is presidential vote choice with support for Republican candidate coded 1, and Democratic candidate or third party candidate coded 0. Unstandardized logistic regression coefficients with robust standard errors in parentheses. Reported probabilities based on two-tailed tests. Statistically significant coefficients at .10 or less in bold. ^bReligion measured by percent Protestant in respondent's county for Ohio data.

Table A3: Issue Mobilization Effect of Gay Marriage Ballot Measures on Bush Support

<i>Covariates</i>	Ohio		Michigan		Arkansas	
	Coef. (S. E.)	P> z	Coef. (S.E.)	P> z	Coef. (S. E.)	P> z
Supports Gay Marriage Ban	1.08 (.16)	.000	1.78 (.22)	.000	2.84 (.40)	.000
Motivated to Vote by Measures on the Ballot	.08 (.07)	.262	.02 (.10)	.813	.33 (.16)	.035
Republican	2.61 (.23)	.000	2.91 (.29)	.000	2.95 (.45)	.000
Democrat	-1.93 (.22)	.000	-2.04 (.25)	.000	-2.44 (.32)	.000
Age	-.003 (.04)	.950	.02 (.05)	.733	-.02 (.01)	.059
Male	-.13 (.16)	.423	.01 (.21)	.961	.78 (.29)	.007
White	2.76 (.51)	.000	1.31 (.39)	.001	1.07 (.40)	.007
Education	.10 (.08)	.230	-.08 (.07)	.246	.13 (.11)	.213
Income					-.01 (.08)	.915
Protestant ^b	-.41 (1.26)	.746	.16 (.21)	.457	.03 (.32)	.924
Suburban	.34 (.19)	.067			.63 (.35)	.075
Rural	.26 (.21)	.220	.001 (.28)	.997	.23 (.37)	.539
Oct	-.44 (.20)	.027				
Nov	-.18 (.19)	.330	.44 (.21)	.038		
Constant	-3.85 (.74)	.000	-2.61 (.70)	.000	-4.32 (.89)	.000
Pseudo R ²	.58		.54		.56	
LR Chi ²	786.36		719.32		451.17	
Number	2155		960		579	

Note: Dependent variable is presidential vote choice with support for Republican candidate coded 1, and Democratic candidate or third party candidate coded 0. Unstandardized logistic regression coefficients with robust standard errors in parentheses. Reported probabilities based on two-tailed tests. Statistically significant coefficients at .10 or less in bold. ^bReligion measured by percent Protestant in respondent's county for Ohio data.

Table A4: Intensity Effect of Issue Priming interacting with Issue Mobilization on Bush Support

<i>Covariates</i>	Ohio			Michigan		Arkansas	
	Coef. (S.E.)	P> z		Coef. (S.E.)	P> z	Coef. (S. E.)	P> z
Mobilized*Supports Gay Marriage Ban	.29 (.15)	.046		-.01 (.19)	.945	-.153 (.403)	.705
Supports Gay Marriage Ban	.24 (.45)	.600		1.82 (.61)	.003	3.32 (1.35)	.014
Motivated to Vote by Measures on the Ballot	-.08 (.12)	.487		.03 (.15)	.839	.45 (.37)	.219
Republican	2.59 (.23)	.000		2.91 (.29)	.000	2.97 (.46)	.000
Democrat	-1.94 (.22)	.000		-2.04 (.25)	.000	-2.44 (.32)	.000
Age	-.006 (.04)	.898		.02 (.05)	.731	-.017 (.01)	.062
Male	-.13 (.16)	.406		.01 (.21)	.959	.78 (.29)	.008
White	2.73 (.51)	.000		1.31 (.39)	.001	1.07 (.40)	.007
Education	.10 (.08)	.212		-.08 (.07)	.247	.13 (.11)	.212
Income						-.01 (.08)	.934
Protestant ^b	-.41 (1.2)	.741		.16 (.21)	.455	.03 (.33)	.925
Suburban	.34 (.19)	.066				.63 (.35)	.074
Rural	.25 (.21)	.241		.001 (.28)	.998	.23 (.37)	.539
Oct	-.43 (.20)	.030					
Nov	-.18 (.19)	.331		.44 (.21)	.038		
Constant	-3.33 (.80)	.000		-2.63 (.79)	.001	-4.73 (1.42)	.001
Pseudo R ²	.58			.54		.56	
LR Chi ²	785.94			719.33		451.32	
Number	2155			960		579	

Dependent variable: presidential vote choice with support for Republican candidate coded 1, and Democratic candidate or third party candidate coded 0. Unstandardized logistic regression coefficients with robust standard errors in parentheses. Reported probabilities based on two-tailed tests. Statistically significant coefficients at .10 or less in bold. ^bReligion measured by percent Protestant in respondent's county for Ohio data.

Table A5: Who Supported the State Gay Marriage Bans?

<i>Covariates</i>	Ohio			Michigan		Arkansas	
	Coef. (S. E.)	P> z		Coef. (S.E.)	P> z	Coef. (S. E.)	P> z
Republican	.97 (.17)	.000		1.19 (.19)	.000	1.03 (.31)	.001
Democrat	-.34 (.17)	.037		-.82 (.17)	.000	-.80 (.24)	.001
Age	.11 (.03)	.000		.07 (.03)	.052	.016 (.01)	.017
Male	.05 (.09)	.622		.29 (.14)	.040	-.27 (.21)	.200
White	-.92 (.17)	.000		-.12 (.24)	.631	-.40 (.29)	.164
Education	-.24 (.05)	.000		-.19 (.05)	.000	-.17 (.08)	.026
Income						.10 (.06)	.097
Protestant ^b	2.11 (.88)	.016		.46 (.13)	.000	.85 (.23)	.000
Suburban	.05 (.11)	.634				.43 (.24)	.076
Rural	.34 (.14)	.011		-.30 (.19)	.119	.31 (.25)	.223
October	-.33 (.12)	.006					
November	-.22 (.11)	.046		-.02(.14)	.880		
Constant	.76 (.35)	.029		.46 (.40)	.251	.35 (.53)	.508
Pseudo R ²	.09			.13		.13	
LR Chi ²	224.02			149.29	.000	72.31	.000
Number	2316			1038		643	

The dependent variable is support for the gay marriage ban, with yes coded 1, and no coded 0.

Unstandardized logistic regression coefficients with robust standard errors in parentheses. Reported probabilities based on two-tailed tests, except where noted. Statistically significant coefficients at .10 or less in bold. ^bReligion measured by percent Protestant in respondent's county for Ohio data.

References:

- Abramowitz, Alan. 2004. "Terrorism, Gay Marriage, and Incumbency: Explaining the Republican Victory in the 2004 Presidential Election," *The Forum*. 2(4): Article 3. <http://www.bepress.com/forum/vol2/iss4/art3>
- Associated Press. 2004. "11 States to Vote on Same Sex Marriage." October 30. <http://abcnews.go.com/Politics/wireStory?id=211544&CMP=OTC-RSSFeeds0312>
- Bartels, Larry. 1988. *Presidential Primaries and the Dynamics of Public Choice*. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press.
- Barth, Jay and Janine Parry. 2005. "Still Swingin'" Arkansas and the 2004 Presidential Race." *American Review of Politics*.
- Boehmke, Fred. 2002. "The Effect of Direct Democracy on the Size and Diversity of State Interest Group Populations." *Journal of Politics*. 64: 827-844.
- Bowler, Shaun and Todd Donovan. 2002. "Democracy, Institutions and Attitudes about Citizen Influence on Government." *British Journal of Political Science*. 32: 371-390.
- Briggs, David. 2004. "Same sex marriage is No. 1 in minds of religious groups." *Cleveland Plain Dealer*. Oct 29. <http://www.cleveland.com/living/plaindealer/index.ssf?/base/living/1099042480252190.xml>
- Burden, Barry. 2004. "An Alternative Account of the 2004 Presidential Election." *The Forum*. 2(4): Article 2. <http://www.bepress.com/forum/vol2/iss4/art2>
- Chavez, Lydia. 1998. *The Color Bind: California's Battle to End Affirmative Action*. Berkeley: University of California Press.
- Gray, Kathleen. "Presidential campaigns, voters upset about misleading calls" *Detroit Free Press*. November 1. http://www.freep.com/news/latestnews/pm1049_20041101.htm
- Gelman, Andrew and Gary King. 1993 "Why are American Presidential Election Campaign Polls so variable when Voters are so Predictable?" *British Journal of Political Science*. 23:409-51.
- Gerber, Elisabeth. 1999. *The Populist Paradox: Interest Group Influence and the Promise of Direct Legislation*. Princeton: Princeton University Press.
- Haider Markel, Donald. 1997. Ph.D. Dissertation. University of Wisconsin.

- Hasen, Richard. 2000. "Parties Take the Initiative (and vice versa)" *Columbian Law Review*. 100: 731-52.
- Higgins, E. Tory. 1996. "Knowledge Activation: Accessibility, Applicability and Salience." in E. T. Higgins and A Kruglanski (eds). *Social Psychology: Handbook of Basic Principles*. New York: Guilford Press.
- Hillygus, Sunshine and Todd Shields. 2005. "Moral Issues and voter Decision Making in the 2004 Presidential Election." *PS: Political Science and Politics*. April.
- Iyengar, Shanto and Donald Kinder 1987. *News that Matters: Television and American Opinion*. Chicago: University of Chicago Press.
- Kaushik, Sandeep. 2004. "Gay marriage backers focus on Ore. battle." *Boston Globe*. Sept 27. http://www.boston.com/news/nation/articles/2004/09/27/gay_marriage_backers_focus_on_ore_battle?pg=full
- Kirkpatrick, David. 2004. "Republicans Admit Mailing Campaign Literature Saying Liberals will Ban the Bible." *New York Times*. September 24. A20.
- Matsusaka, John. 2005. *For the Many or the Few: The Initiative, Public Policy, and American Democracy*. Chicago: University of Chicago Press.
- Mendelberg, Tali 2001. *The Race Card: Campaign Strategy, Implicit Messages and the Norm of Equality*. Princeton: Princeton University Press.
- Montemurri, Patricia and Marisol Bello. 2004 "PROPOSAL 2: Marriage ban divides, unites religions" *Detroit Free Press*. October 21 2004. http://www.freep.com/news/politics/samesex21e_20041021.htm
- Nie, Norman and Kristi Anderson. 1974. "Mass Belief Systems Revisited: Political Change and Attitude Structure." *Journal of Politics*. 36: 541-91.
- Nie, Norman, Sidney Verba and John Petrocik 1976. *The Changing American Voter*. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press.
- Nicholson, Steven P. 2005. *Voting the Agenda: Candidates Elections and Ballot Propositions*. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press.
- Popkin, Samuel. 1991. *The Reasoning Voter: Communication and Persuasion in Presidential Campaigns*. Chicago: University of Chicago Press.
- Repass, David E. 197. "Issue Salience and Party Choice." *American Political Science Review*. 65: 29-58.

- Schrag, Peter. 1998. *Paradise Lost: California's Experience, America's Future*. New York: New Press.
- Smith, Daniel A. and Caroline Tolbert. 2001. "The Initiative to Party: Partisanship, Ballot Initiatives on Voter Turnout." *American Politics Research* 29:625-648.
- Smith, Daniel A. 2001 "Campaign Finance of Ballot Initiatives in the American States." in L. Sabato, B. Larson and H. Ernst (eds). *Dangerous Democracy?* Lanham, MD: Rowman and Littlefield.
- Smith, Mark. 2001. "The Contingent Effects of Ballot Initiatives and Candidate Races on Turnout" *American Journal of Political Science*. 45: 700-06.
- Sniderman, Paul., Richard A. Brody and Philip E. Tetlock. 1991. *Reasoning and Choice: Explorations in Political Psychology*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
- Tolbert, Caroline and Daniel A. Smith. 2005. "The Educative Effects of Ballot Initiatives on Voter Turnout." *American Political Research* 33: 283-309.
- Valentino, Nicholas A. 1999. "Crime News and the Priming of Racial Attitudes during Evaluations of the President." *Public Opinion Quarterly*. 63: 293-320.
- West, Darrell M. 1997. *Air Wars: Television Advertising in Election Campaigns, 1952-1996*. Washington, DC: CQ Press.
- Witt, Stephanie L. and Suzanne McCorkel. 1997. *Anti-Gay Rights: Assessing Voter Initiatives*. Westport, CT: Praeger.